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The discussions leading up to the signature of the Treaty on European
Union and, In particular, Its article 3B have emphaslsed the Importance
which the CoIIInu.nlty attaches to the three linked IssUes of greater
democrat Ic control, more transparency In Comnwnlty leglslat Ion and other
ac~lon and the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. Tl1e Commission
considers that all three elements need to be carried through into the
practices of the COmmunity. It has made and will continue to make .
positive contribution In this direction. This communication deals only
with the principle Of subsidiarity, Its scope and Its application In
three areas: the preparation of COmmunity action, the management of
COmmunity policies and the financial and other control of C()II\II\unl 
activities.
The DreDaratlon and examination of DroDosed Community action
The Inclusion of the principle of sUbsidiarity In the Treaty l!IIposes an
obligation on all the Institutions which participate In the process of
decision but In view of Its power of Initiative the COIIIIIIlsslon has 
particularly important role. The principle of subsidiarity does not
determine which competences are attr lbuted to the COmmunity: this 
determined by the Treaty Itself. It Is, however, an Important principle
regulat Ing the exercise of these competences. In pnct leal terms 
Implies for the Communi ty Inst I tut Ions, and In part Icular for the
COmmission , the application of the simple principle of gOOd sense that,
In the exercise of Its competences, the COIIIIIIunlty should do only what Is
best done at this level. The burden of proof Is on the COmmunity
Institutions to show that there Is a need to legislate and take action at
Community level and. at the Intensity proposed. The principle of course
operates In both directions: If, within the field of CommUnity
competences, a decision or action at Community level meets these
requirements, .It should be undertaken at this level. For reasons which
have to dO with subsidiarity Itself, the principle must be examined
together with the content of a proposal or action.
Subsidiarity and Its brother principle, proportionality, were not
Invented at Maastricht; They exist In the legislative and other
practices of the community. However, article 38 of the Treaty on European
Union Is more explicit. The cr Iter la for I ts future appllcat Ion can be
sketched out. They need not be complicated. They should help to assure
the citizen that decisions will be taken as closely as possible to the
citizen himself, without damaging the advantages which he gains from
common action at the level Qf the whole COmmunity and without changing
the Institutional balance.- 2 -
The analysis of article 3B leads to the following concluslons:-
The first paragraph underlines that the competences are given by the
Treaty and that the limits of these competences must be respected. Within
these limits the COmmUnity has an obligation to achieve the necessary
result: to attain the objectives which the Treaty assigns to It.
The second paragraph concerns the areas where the community has not an
exclusive competence and deals with the Quest Ion whether the COIIIIIIunlty
should act In a specific case. This article requires that the ComII\Unlty
should only Intervene I rand In so far as the object Ivee of the proposed
action cannot be real I sed sufficiently by th.e member states. This implies
that we have to examine If there are other methods available fOr member
states.. for ex.ample leglslat Ion, adnUn  stratiVe Instruct ions or codes of
conduct, In order to achieve the objectives In a sufficient manner. This
is the test of  comoaratlve efficiency between ~unlty action and that
of member states
The factors which could be examined In such cases are the effect of the
scale of the operat Ion (transfrontier problems, cr It leal mass. etc.
the cost of Inaction, the necessity to maintain a reasonable coherence,
the possible limits on act Ion at nat Io.nal level (Inc.ludlng cases of
potent I a I distortion where some member states were ab I e to act .and others
were not aple to do so) and thehecesslty to ensure that competition Is
not distorted within the common market.
If .It were conciuded that a proposai passes the test of comparat Ive
eft I c I ency, It would st III be necessary to respond to the Question "what
should be the Intensity and the nature of the COmmunity action?" . This
recalls the pr Inclple of proport Io.nallty which Is already an element of
the case law of the COmmunity. It is necessary to examine carefully If an
Interventlo.n by legislative means Is necessary or If other means which
are sufficiently effective can be used. If It Is necessary to legislate
the COmmission will as far as possible favour framework leglslat Ion,
minimum norms and mutual recognition and more generally avoid a too
detal led leglslat Ive prescr Ipt Ion.
The third paragraph of article 3B applies not only to the area of .shared
competences. but also to the area of exclusive competence. It reaffirms
that the pI" Inclple of proport lonall ty, for which certain cr Iter la are set
out above, should apply, but does not alter the attribution of
competence.
Manaaement of Community act Ion
It Is Important that, when legislation Is being prepared. there should be
careful examination of the possibilities of decentrallslng the management
of Community action. In practice this should be often the result Of the
use of framework directives, since the legislation transpo.sed at natlo.nal
level would no.rmally be Implemented on the ground by the national or
regional authorities with due r.espect fgr the constitutional re.qulrements
of the I"ndlvldual member states. However. In tit"case of other propo.sed
leglsla.t Ion, the possibility of specific decentrallsat Ion 9f the
management of COIIIIIIunlty action should also be examined. This corresponds
to the need to maintain such actions, where possible, as close to. the
citizen as- 3 -
possible. I  Is also often Inevitable, In view of th'" . act that the
European public service Is very small and the national and regional
publ.lc services very large.
The Commission will continue to examine possible definitions of a more
precise kind of the types of act Ion which might be decentrallsed and of
the elements of control and follow-up which might need to remain direct 
within the commission s responsibility. The community has already adopted
a number of Initiatives In this direction, In particular the development
of the partnership In the operat Ion of the structural policies.
Contro I
A useful distinction can be made between those areas where Community
money Is being COIIIIIIltted IInd those areas .w.bere there Is no financial
element. In the first case the Commission must fulf.11 Its
responsibilities In relation to the COmmunity budget. In .other c.ses the
possibility of a devolved control should always be considered, provided
that the member states In the sector concerned dispose of an adequate
structure for this purpose.
The COmmission will In part Icular be examining:
a wider use of de minimis rules;
the possibility that In the application of COmmunity law the member
states should cooperate more closely In the examlnat Ion 
complaints for non-respect of community law;
In some sectors a possible system of direct application of controls
by member states themselves, with a regular series of reports to
the COmmunity Institutions, leaving open the possibility of
referr Ing Issues to the COurt of Just Ice I f these reports Indicated
an unut I sfactory 81 tuatl on.
The paragraphs above I.ndlcate that the commission has carried forward Its
work In the ana of the appllcat Ion of the pr Inclple of subsldiar!ty,
over and above the engageillent wh.lch It took at the lisbon European
COuncil to Justify In legislative proposals the need for such action at
COmmunity level. In our view the two key eleillents are the need for all
those concerned In the community Inst Itut Ions to recognlse the need to
JustifY Intervention and the need to examine the Intensity of the manner
In which Intervention at COmmunity level Is proposed. We do not think
that thera should be a stat Ie Interpretat Ion of these two Important
concepts. We should not ~stop the film" of community development. On an
I nterna I bas I s. the COmm I ss Ion has prepared a more deta II ed jur I d i co-
technical document Intended to contr Ibute to the def inlt Ion of the
principle and Its better application; this document Is annexed.
Furthermore the COmmission has already Indicated that there could be
advantage In an Interinstitutional agreement on this point and 
prepared to suggest a text, I f this course seemed acceptab I  to the
Parliament and to the Council.ANNEX
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1. The subsidiarity principle as applied in the institutional context is
based on a simple concept: the powers that a state or a federation of
States wields in the common interest are only those which individuals,
families, companies and local or regional authorities cannot exercise in
isolation. This commonsense principle therefore dictates that decisions
should be taken at the level closest to the ordinary citizen and that
action taken by the upper echelons of the body politic should be
limited.
2. The first application in law of this essentially political principle is
to be found in the relationship between some of the Member States and
their regions, where it takes various forms depending on their
constitutional traditions.
In the Community context, subsidiarity meanS that the functions handed
over to the community are those which the Member States, at the various
levels of decision-making, can no longer discharge satisfactorily. Any
transfer of powers must have due regard for national identity and the
powers of the regions. The Member States, for their part, are required
to facilitate the attainment of the Community' s objectives by Article 
of the EEC Treaty.
The subsidiarity principle is enshrined in the preamble and in
Articles Band 3b of the Treaty on European Union. It was present in
embryonic form in the ECSC Treaty (Article 5), implicit in the Treaty of
Rome, and spelled out in the Single European Act in relation to the
environment (Article l30r).
Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept in the Community system. Far from
putting community action in a straitjacket, it allows it to be expanded
where circumstances so require and, conversely, to be restricted or
abandoned where it is no longer justified.
3. For more than forty years the subsidiarity principle has satisfied two
requirements: the need for community action and the need to ensure that
the means employed are commensurate with the objectives pursued, in
other words, proportionality.-2-
All the major initiatives taken by the Commission have been based on a
juGtification of the need for action. The common policies provided for
h~ the 'l'reaty of Rome, the creation of a frontier-free area and the
flanking policies provided for in the Single Act - all these initiatives
have been fully justified by the imperatives of European integration.
Everyone accepts that these tasks could only be effectively undertaken
at European level. The re.sults speak for themselves.
What is surprising is that certain other obligations to act, imposeci by
the authors of the Treaty, have still not been met in full. The list
includes transport policy, certain aspects of commercial policy, and,
indeed, some key provisions of the Euratom Treaty.
The  intensity of Community action is sometimes criticizeci, the finger
being pointed in particular at excessively detailed rules in highly
sensitive areas (environment, health), regarded, rightly or wrongly, as
being essential to the creation of a single market.
The fact that proposals are often requested by the Councilor by
Parliament, that wide-ranging consultations are held with all concerned
(green papers, meetings of experts, etc. ), that the initial proposals
are expandeci or altered beyond recognition by the Councilor Parliament
is of little consequence. The public perception is that the Commission
is mainly to blame for any rules or regulations which seem to conflict
with the subsidiarity principle. Its having to bear the brunt of such
criticism is especiully unfair when it is doing no more than fulfil the
two prime tasks assigneci to it by the Treaty: exercising its sole right
of initiative and acting as the custodian of community law.
4. Be that as it may, the enshrinement of snbsidiarity in the Treaty and
the importance attached to it by the Member states provide an
opportunity for all the institutions, and above all the Commission with
its right of initiative, to confine Community action to the~ssentials,
to do less to achieve more.
It also provides an opportunity to stress that subsidiarity cannot be
used to bring the Commission to heel by challenging its right of
initiative and  in th.is way altering the balance .established by the
Treaties. There is an interinstitutional dimension to subsidiarity
which also has a bearing on the democratic deficit.- 3 -
I. CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT
1.  The distinction between Coromunity powers, shared powers and national
powers
(a) coromunity powers and national powers
It must be made quite clear from the outset that the subsidiarity principle
regulates the  exercise of powers rather than the conferment of powers.
conferment of powers is a matter for the writers of our "constitution
t.he
that is to say, of the Treaty. A consequence of this is that the powers
conferred on the coromunity, in contrast to those reserved to the Member
states, cannot be assumed.
A first consequence of the subsidiarity principle - too often ignored - is
implicit in the first paragraph of Article 3b, namely that  national powers
are the rule and the Commun.i.ty s the exception This explains why it would
be pointless, at "constitutional" level, to list the" power!; reserved to the
Member states.
However,  the absence of a list of national powers creates a political
problem to the extent that local authorities, and indeed the general
public, in certain Member states conclude that there are no precise limits
to intervention by the community, which stands accused of being able to
meddle where it pleases.
If subsidiarity is to be translated into concrete terms for the benefit of
the general public, the first question to be answered is whether it might
not be better to indicate the main areas reserved to the Member states
rather than simply affirm that national powers are the rule.
(b) Exclusive powers and shared powers
A second difficulty posed by the Treaty on European Union is that, while
the authors did enumerate and at time.s cArefully circumscribe the
Community s powers, they also drew a distinction in Article3b between
exclusive community competence and competence shared with the Member States
without defining or specifying the content of each of these "blocks of
competence. "4 -
This means that there is no clear line of demarcation between exclusive and
shared powers. The fact is, however, that the distinction between the two
is extremely important because the need for action is assessed quite
differently depending on the type of powers.
2.  The two dimensions of the subsidiarity principle
Under the terms of Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty, the notion of
subsidiarity covers two distinct legal concepts which are often confused:
the need for action (second paragraph)
the intensity (proportionality) of the action taken (third paragraph).
(a) As far as  need is concerned, subsidiarity governs the very principle of
community intervention and it is for the Community to demonstrate the
justification for Community action in preference to action taken, or action
which could be taken, by the Member states to achieve the objectives of the
Treaty.
However, the second paragraph of Article 3bdoes not require the Community
to demonstrate the need for action except" in areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence" , that is to say, in areas of shared
competence.
In other words, the authors of the Treaty assumed that, in certain areas,
the Community was the only appropriate level for taking the action needed
to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.
Since the Treaty does not define the notion of exclusive competence or list
the areas covered, it is for the institutions, and in the first place the
Commission, to agree on a common approach to avoid endless demarcation
disputes between exclusive competence and shared competence with the
attendant dangers of watering down the " need" element of subsidiarity.- 5 -
FurthermQre, the suBsi8iarity principle - as a test of whether a given
shared power qualifies for Community action - does not apply in the same
way to all the objectives set by the Treaty. The constraints under which
the institutions operate, and the instruments available to them, differ
according to the responsibilities assigned to the Community (as between
cohesion policy and c.ivil protection, for example).
(b) As far as  intensity is concerned, subsidiarity pro~ides a guarantee
that the extent of the action taken will not be out of proportion to the
objective pursued, irrespective of whether the powers exercised are
exclusive or shared, as stipulated in the third paragraph of Article 3b.
We need to give substance to a well-known problem, the problem of
proportionality, and translate political will into practice; if action is
needed to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, it must not be
disproport ionate; this implies that recourSe to the most binding
instruments should be used as a last resort and that, wherever possible,
priority should be given to support measures rather than regulations, to
mutual recognition rather than harmonization, to framework directives
rather than detailed rules and regulations, etc.
II. THE CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF EXCLUSIVE POWERS
1.  The characteristics of exclusive powers
Legally speaking, the notion of exclusive powers is characterized by two
elements:
(a)  A functional element an obligation on the Community to act because it
is regarded as having sole responsibility for the performance of certain
tasks.
The obligation to act should be clearly and precisely imposed by the Treaty
itself - for example, Article 8a: The Community shall adopt measures with
the aim of progressively establishing the inter~l market over a period
expiring on 31 December 1992 .... r Article 40:
" . .. 
a common
organization of agricultural markets shall be established"- 6 -
~he ~reaty also provides for sanctions in the event of failure to comply
with the obligation to act. ~he Court of Justice has already found against
the Council for failure to act in the transport sector.
(b)  A material element
unilaterally.
the Member States lose the right to act
~hisdoes not mean that the Member states can no longer legislate. ~hey
can still do so if the Community agrees - on certain aspects of commercial
policy, for e1Cample - or provides an umbrella for national action.
Community could decide that this loss should be complete.
But the
But we cannot conclude that, because the Community has exclusive competence
for an area defined in the ~reaty (for example, common organizations of
agricultural markets with a view to achieving the objectives of
Article 39), all responsibility for the activity in question (agric!llt!lre,
say) is covered by exclusive competence. ~he text of the ~reaty cannot be
interpreted so broadly as to leave common sense out of account.
In some cases, too, an obligation to act does not reflect any wish to
deprive the Member states of the right to act.
2.  ~he block of exclusive powers
SO that the Community can attain its objectives, certain obligations to act
have been imposed on it. These include, in particular, the creation of an
area without internal frontiers, the strengthening of economic and social
cohesion, and the establishment of economic and monetary union (Article B
of the Maastricht ~reaty).
(a) At the present stage in the Community s development it is
impossible, legally speaking, to determine whether all these obligations to
act entail exclusive powers for the Community and in particular whether
they deprive the Member states of the right to act.
Areas of exclusive powers covered by the l!:CSC and Eurabom Treaties have
been disregarded.-7-
Under the terms of the .Maastricht Treaty itself "exclusive competence" and
common policy" - whatever the scale of that policy - are concepts as
different as "objective" and "obligation to act..
Historically the concept of exclusive competence originally grew out of the
obligation to establish the "common market" , which was spelled out in very
firmly binding terms, including the fixing of a deadline under the Single
Act.
In this sense it is possible to speak of a genuine obligation to act
leading, in the course of time and through the rulings of the COurt of
Justice, to the formation of a block of exclusive powers centred around the
four fundamental freedoms and certain common policies essential to, or a
corollary of, the establishment of an internal market.
What is involved here is:
the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital (Article 8.a);
the common commercial policy (Article 113), which guarantees the unity
of the internal market;
the general rules on competition, which guarantee a level playing field
in the internal market;
the common organi2;ation of agricultural markets , a preconditiOn for the
free movement of agricultural products; it was decided as long ago as
1957 that this would be governed by specific. rules reflecting the wider
objectives of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty;
the conservation of fisheries resources (Article 102 of the 1972 Act of
Accession) and the common organization of the fishery markets by analogy
with agriculture;
the essential elements of transport policy as long ago as 1957 the
authors of the Treaty imposed precise obligations to act (such as
Article 75(1) (a) and (b)).-8-
(b) The demarcat.ion lines of t1ris~block o-f exclusive powers will.. have
to change as Europe.an integration progresses. They cannot remain' frozen.
For one thing, the Maastricht Treaty provides for future single monetary
and exchange rate policies which should ultimately lead to exclusive
Community competence in the final stage of EMU.
Furthermore it is clearly not easy to draw a line between implementing the
four freedoms and what some people refer to as the smooth operation of the
single market. The dynamics of the four freedoms generate ~ and will
continue to generate - an impetus towards flanking measures which in turn
call for the introduction of genuine policies 1environment and cohesion,
for example), albeit ones that do not at present involve exclusive
Community competence - that is, the possibility of depriving the Member
states of the power to act.
3.  The exercise of exclusive powers
One consequence of the existence of a block of exclusive powers, joined by
the common thread of an internal market, is that the Community does not
have to demonstrate the need for action on each occasion where free
movement is involved. It is true that there is some latitude here, but the
subsidiarity principle cannot be invoked to question the advisability of
Community action.
In the exercise of exclusive powers, the Community has an entire armoury at
its di posal (notably the weapon of harmonization), but this does not mean
that it has to legislate systematically and cover the sector concerned in
its entirety.
It has to be admitted that "area" of exclusive powers is an unfortunate
expression. It must be assumed that the  exclusive powers flowing from an
~bligation to act are strictly construed, because they represent an
exception to Community powers as a whole. The exclusiveness of powers is
not determined by the matter covered (cars, capital), but by the
imperatives of free movement. This is why not all the measuJ:es associated
with the smooth operation of the internal market fall undeJ: exclusive-9-
Community comp~t~nc~. For ~xampl~, whil~ harmonization of th~ VAT bas~
(d~ciding wh~th~r a giv~n typ~ of product is subj~ct to tax) do~S fall
withinth~ ar~a of ~xclusiv~ pow~rs, it is doubtful wh~th~r uniform VAT
rat~s ar~ ~ss~ntial to fr~~ mov~m~nt.
In practical t~rms, this m~ans that the circumscription of powers to a
block of policy m~asures linked to free movement must not be confused with
occupation of the terrain by the legislator. This raises another problem,
the issue of  primacy There is nothing to prevent the Community legislator
allowing M~mber stat~s to legislate on measures which are not, or are no
longer, ess~ntial to free mov~ment, provided that they resp~ct th~ primacy
of the Community ' s legal order.-10-
III.. INTERPRETING THE NEED FOR ACTION WHEN POWERS ARE SHARED
A 1 t 'lOUr:';' the subsidiarity principle is not a determining factor when the
Cor !unit? is under the obligation to produce results, the situation is
di  (;rent it. areas where it shares powers with the Member states.
Article :n. provides that the Community takes action only if and in so far
as i Le objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States.
E~~h case must therefore be considered individually in the light of two
test0 laid down in Article 3b ~ the Beale and the effects of the proposed
action. This would involve:
checking that the Member States have at their disposal the means -
including the financial means - to the end (national, regional or local
legislation, codes of conduct, agreements between employers and trade
unions , etc. ) - the  comparative efficiency test
assessing the effectiveness of Community action (its scale, cross-border
problems, consequences of failure to act, critical mass , etc. ) - the
value added test.
However , it is obvious that in the vast range of areas in which powers are
shared, the need for Community action cannot always be assessed in the same
manner.
Neither the objectives assigned to the Community nor the instruments
available to the institutions for achieving them are uniform. This derives
from the Treaty itself, which prescribes certain forms of action in one
area and rules out other forms of action in other areas.
BQari ng this in mind, and allowing for the inevitable lack of precision in
an exercise of this kind, it is possible to propose a guide to the various
ways of exercising shared powers which under no circumstances should be
treated as a kind of ranking order.
Legislative measures smooth operation of the internal market and the
~ommon policies (agriculture, transport, fisheries),. certain social,
environmental and conaumer protect10n. measures,- irr part.icular when they are
related to the internal. market.-11-
There i8 a  very strong political resolve to take action because of the
development or the internal market. The aim is not just to remove barriers
but to facilitate freedom of movement through common legislation, flanking
measures and the completion of the single market.
The instruments are, for the most part, harmonization and mutual
recognition. Qualified majority voting is given precedence.
Joint measures: economic and aocial cohesion, research.
The political resolve is again  very strong  in matters of cohesion ("The
Community shall ... pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its
economic and social cohesion ), while it is strong for research (" ... the
objective of strengthening the scientific and technological bases of
Community industry
The  instruments are programmes based on the principle of partnership with
the Member States, firms or regions.
Development cooperation, too, should already come under this head, as will
the common foreign and security policy as and when joint measures are
identified gradually implementing... joint action in the areas in which
the Member States have important interests in common
3 . Supportive measures certain social and environmental measures,
trans-European networks, industrial policy, consumer protection and
vocational training.
The Treaty gives the institutions a great deal of latitude for deciding
whether to take action.
A variety of  instruments are used, the most common being support
programmes.- 12 -
Complementary measures education, culture, health.
There- is'  little po1itical.reso'lve.
- .
The Tre:atYditpecificall.y-.'rulesolIt
harmonization,. The. aim is merely to complement :and. support- national
measures.
In some fields the Community has only potential powers (tourism, civil
protection) and. their implementation is strictly limited by the
requirements of Article 235.- 13 -
IV. SUBSIDIARITY AND INTENSITY OF ACTION
The purpose of the subsidiarity principle is to give general application to
the rule that the mean3 should be proportional to the ends.
In practical terms, subsidiarity means that, when exercising its powers,
the community must, where various equally effective options are available,
choose the form of action or measure which leaves the Member states,
individuals or businesses concerned the greatest degree of freedom.
Beyond this general rule, though, is the implication that if a binding
measure proves necessary, the actual degree of regulation should be kept to
a minimum.
1.  Choosing the appropriate form of action
The Community has a wide range of options available to it. It can:
enact legislation in a variety of forms:
the simple provision of a common instrument to supplement national
legislation (e.g. the European company);
approximation of laws;
harmonization - either total or optional - or harmonization by
means of general rules or of detailed specifications;
impose mutual .recognition;
adopt recommendations;
provide financial support via regional development programmes
(structural Funds) or joint projects (networks) based on
interoperability;
promote cooperation between Member states (e.g. Erasmus);
encourage desirable forms of behaviour (e.g. agreements between the two
sides of industry, undertakings from businesses to respect certain
standards of conduct in their dealings with each other) or direct or
coordinate private or public initiatives;
become a party to international agreements.-14-
with the exception of legislation, most of the options listed. above are
based, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, on a partnership with
bodies which are closer to the individual than the community institutions,
e.g. regional authorities, businesses, associations and trade unions.
The main choice where subsidiarity is concerned is between binding and
non-binding measures. The decision whether or not to legislate should be
based on an assessment of:
the importance of uniformity in the field in question and, in
particular, the need for non-discrimination and certainty as to the law;
and,
where appropriate, the degree of technical complexity of the area in
question (e.g. harmonization of technical standards using the old
approach) .
If legislation is not imperative on the basis of these tests, subsidiarity
requires that:
preference should be given to  support programmes or programmes to
coordinate national measures, as opposed to harmonization of laws;
the Community should make greater use of the  recommendation, while
reserving the right to resort to legislation if this proves necessary,
particularly if the recommendation does not have the desired effect;
this connection, the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 of the EEC
Treaty need to be developed further (these articles call for
recommendations as a first step, followed by harmonization of laws if
required) ; and
particular attention should be paid to the possibility in certain cases
of achieving the objectives set out in the Treaty through  international
agreements rather than via an internal instrument, for subsidiarity
surely also means not legislating at Community level when action is
already being taken at international level and proving just as effective
as Community action.- 15 -
The intensity of legislative action
If legislative action ia necessary, the subsidiarity principle dictates
that Community legislation and national measures each be given its own
respective role: Community legislation forms the framework into which
national action must be fitted.
For this purpose, the Treaty of Rome devised an original instrument which
typifies subsidiarity: the directive sets the result to be achieved but
leaves it to the Member states to choose the most appropriate means of
doing so. lt differs from the regulation, which applies directly and in
its entirety to states, firms and individuals and, where necessary,
supersedes national legislation. When the Single Act was adopted, the
Intergovernmental Conference again stressed the need to give pride of place
to the directive as the instrument for establishing the frontier-free area.
In practiGe, of Gourse, the distinction between directive and regulation
has become blurred, in some c.ases for good r.easons (need for uniform
rules), but in others for less honourable ones (to avoid the detour via a
national parliamentary procedure). Be that as it may, the directive no
longer enjoys any preference over the regulation and, when it is used, it
is generally as detailed as a regulation and leaves hardly any margin of
manoeuvre for transposal.
If the subsidiarity exercise is to produce any overall tangible results,
then it must unquestionably be by systematically reverting to the original
concept of the directive as a framework of general rules, or even simply of
objectives, for the attainment of which the Member States have sole
reaponeibi l ity.
Similarly, preferenGe must be given to the techniques of minimum standards
and mutual recognition.
Regulations should remain the exception, to be resorted to only where there
is an overriding need for uniform rules, in particular to guarantee the
rights and obligations of individuals and firms.- 16 -
3.  The need for a hierarchy of norms
.'J.1here~- are"unfo;r.tunat.aly . no .mi:.racle .curesthat will pr:eYent. "instrument,
betmj overburdened with a surfeit ofdet.ail, aSlfJ.borne,ottt-by the.
incapacity of. most. Member states to contain' the plethora of highly detailed
rules and regulations produced by their own government departments.
There can be no escaping the fact that the solution, as the Commission
proposed to the Intergovernmental Conference (which accepted only the
principle), will involve writing into the constitution a genuine hierarchy
of norms. A declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty states that "the
Intergovernmental Conference to he convened in 1996 will examine to what
extent it might .be possible to review the classification of Community acts
with a view to establishing an appropriate hierarchy between the different
categories of acts"
There is much to be said .for inserting in the legislative proceSs a new
type of instrument above the regulation - the framework law - which. would
lay down the basic principles and essential rules for an operation, in
keeping with the idea of a directive. First of all, from the point of view
of democracy, this would strengthen Parliament in its natural function as
legislator but would also involve it in enforcing the subsidiarity
principle by generally transferring responsibility for implementing a law
to the national authorities. National parliaments would thus acquire an
active role in the Community process instead of being relegated, as all too
often at present, to a rubber-stamp function for the transposal of an
instrument. On .the other hand, such laws would be implemented by Community
regulations in respect of those aspects which, for reasons of certainty as
to the law and non--discrimination, require uniform rules.
Without awaiting the outcome of a new intergovernmental conference, .better
use could be made of ~isting. instruments to reduce Community legislation
to the essential and leave .a greater margin of manoeuvre ..forimplementation
. to the Member states and to the.Commissionwhenlu1titorm rules are requirea.-17-
4.  Transparency of instruments
Finally, in view of the importance of the public debate on subsidiarity and
the need for instruments to be made more comprehensible, not only for
economic operators but also for ordinary citizens who to an increasing
extent are directly concerned by Community legislation, special care and
attention should be paid to clarity and conciseness right frOm the proposal
stage. Moreover, consolidation should be systematic - if necessary in the
form of publication solely for information purposes in the Official
Journal - as soon as an instrument has been amended a number of times.
is not acceptable, in a community governed by law, that individuals and
firms should be forced, if they wish to know their rights in the jungle of
Community legislation, to produce their own consolidated versions of the
enactments in force.-18-
V. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF IMPLEMENTATION
The practical implications of the subsidiarity principle as regards the
management and supervision of implementation are difficult to ascertain at
this point in the process of European integration. Even if the question of
the very existence of decentralized machinery for applying s:ubsidiarity is
resolved, we are still faced with a problem of ml.1tual trl.1st between the
institutions; between some Member States and the insi:it:utions, and between
the Member States. themseJ.ves . What is more, the Commission cannot
surrender its ultimate supervisory responsibility when public. mon:ey from
the COmmunii:y budget is involved.
1.  Subs.idiarity and the management of Community activ.ities
The application of the subsidiarity principle to the management of
community activities is connected with the familiar problem of the
delegation of implementing pow~s. The difficulties raised by the
straightforward delegation of such powere by the Council to the Commission
or to agenciee is well known.
It ie to be hoped that the Member States will agree to the decentralized
management of a number of the Commieeion' s more burdensome activities.
There ie no dol.1bt that, all things coneidered, the Member Statee often
prefer direct management by the Commieeion, over which they exercise
collective control, rather than management entrusted to national or
regionalagenciee whoee efficiency and regularity are more difficult to
control on a shared basie.
The eolution might be to arrive at a precise definition of the types of
activity to be decentralized, the nature of the decentralized management
machinery and the amount of expenditure which can be allocated for thie
purpoee.
2.  Subsidiarity and eupervision of implementation
The present situation is unsatiefactory. The bulk of supervisory work is
performed by the Commission either in its capacity as the custodian of
Community law or by virtue of its powers to implement the budget.
The Commission has already become lese involved with certain control
activities in areas which do not affect freedom of movement as regards, for
instance, national aid schemes of minor importance and "thresholds " for
mergers. It will continue to give thought to the matter of petty
infr ingements.-19-
However, over and above the "de minimis" rule, it is importal11:: that more
decentralized procedures be introduced for supervising the application of
Community law in order to avoid "apoplexy at the centre and paralysis at
the extremities The best solution would be for the Member States to
cooperate more closely in the examination of complaints for failure to
comply with Community law. But first of all national examining procedures
would not have to show any marked differences in terms of guarantees and
costs for plaintiffs. It will be recalled that during the
Intergovernmental Conference the Cornmissionproposed that each Member state
shOuld designate an ombudsman who would have a rOle to play in such
matters.
Consideration might be given to the introduction of systematic
decentralized controls on the lines of those which already exist in the
public procurement sector, with the possibility for the national
authorities to order by summary procedure the suspension of any
contract-award procedures which do not comply with the transparency and
equal-treatment requirements contained in Community legislation.
Another avenue worth exploring is for the Member States to be made directly
responsible for supervising the application of Community law - for example,
in the environment or technical harmonization fields. Each Member state
would send annual statements to the Community institutions. In the event
of default, the Community would be entitled to refer the matter to the
Court of Justice and ultimately apply financial "sanctions" (along the
lines of the clearance of the EAGGF accounts or of the penalty payments
provided for in Article 171 of the Treaty).
Lastly, in those areas where an acute problem of mutual trust arises,
inspiration should be drawn from experiences such as that of the steel
industry during the crisis of the late seventies by developing a system of
cross-over" controls .where an engineer from a firm in one Member State was
sent to a firm in another Member State on the strength of a Community
instruction to help check that capacity had been cut back and that prices
and quotas were being enforced.-20-
VI. THE SOLUTION - AN INTERJ:RSTITUTIONAL AGUJmENT
1.  Need to reconcile a number of imperatives
'1'he  subsidiarity exerci.se has to reconcile a number of imperatives:
ona pract.ical level~ Community action .must be made .moreeffective -
less, but do it better" 
on .a pOlitical level, the Member .Statetil iHld public op1ni:on ..tII1;IStbe
reass,uredthat it is nottheConunission s intention to dond.nate;
on a legal level~ goodintentl.ons must be translated into binding
conunitmenttil;
on an institutional levei, the existingba1ancemuHt be maintained -
particularly the .Commission' sright of initiative.
An interinst1tutional agreement, by providing clear definition.s and a
precise demarcation of powers, would permit these objectives to be
reconciled while allowing the present institutional balance to be preserved
intact.
If the Commission must be prepared to demonstrate in every catile that the
subsidiarity principle has been observed, it must be made clear, in return,
that when its proposals are being examined  there must be no question of
separating the issue of subsidiarity from the substance of the matter in
hand and in this way obstructing by degrees the decision-making process.
Subsidiarity is part of decitilion-making~ not a precondition for it
must be considered together with all the other aspects (legal basis,
substantive provisions, etc. ) in accordance with the voting conditions
applying to a proposal. Only at the end of the examination of a proposal,
if Parliament or the Council (general affairs) feels that it conflicts with
subsidiarity, could the commission, at their express request, reconsider it
in that light.
There should also be provision for the Commission, in the context of
interinstitutional cooperation, to " sound the alarm" if amendments
introduced by the Councilor Parliament are inconsistent with the
subsidiarity principle, and the Commission' s right to withdraw its proposal
in such circumstances should be confirmed.-21-
Content of interinstitutional agreement
After first giving a common definition of the concept of exclusive powers -
or else drawing the dividing line with shared powers - this agreement could
contain two types of provision relating to:
(a) The intensity of Community action, i.e. implementation of th~
principl~ of proportionality.
In all areas, whether pow~rs are ~xclusive or shared:
Priority will be given to the implementation of programmes of action to
support and coordinate national action, or to recommendations, rather
than to systematic harmonization of legislation.
Particular attention will be paid to the possibility of attaining the
Treaty' s objectives by the Community and/or its Member States acceding
to an international convention rather than by adopting community
legislation.
Where the enactment of a binding instrument is found to be necessary,
the Commission will give preference to the directive, and specifically
to the framework directive, and to the techniques of the minimum
standard, mutual recognition and the possibilities offered by
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty.
A constant effort shall be devoted to ensuring that instruments are
clear and concise, and to consolidation.
(b) The principles of cooperation between the institutions:
The Commission' s work programme will be presented to Parliament, the
Council and the national parliaments. The Commission will undertake to
pay special attention to the remarks of the national parliaments
concerning subsidiarity.
All Commission proposals to the Council and Parliament will contain an
explanatory memorandum, to be published in the Official Journal, and a
recital justifying the instrument in terms of subsidiarity.-22-
gstablishing that there is no conflict with the subsidiarity principle
forms an integral part  of  the examination  of  a Commission proposal and
may not be separated from it.
If  Parliament or the Council wish to make a substantial amendment to a
Commission proposal, they must state their grounds with specific
reference to the subsidiarity principle.
If  Parliament or the council (generalaffairs~ ~onsider t~a~ ~be
Commission proposal conflicts with the subsidiarity principle, they may,
stating their grounds and undeJ;' the v9ting conditions apJ?lying to the
proposal, ask the .Commis.sion to r.econsider. Once the Commission has
done so, they will resume their consideration  the pJ;'opo~al.
If  the commission feels that the amen~ents to its proposal are SUCh as
to eOl1flLct with the subsidiarity principle, it wi;ll IIII1ke a EJpecific
report to the Council (general affairs) and parliament and, if need be,
withdraw its proposal.